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‘Peace through strength’: Europe and NATO deterrence beyond the US 
Nuclear Posture Review 
 
TREVOR McCRISKEN AND MAXWELL DOWNMAN* 
 
With the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), Donald Trump’s administration put its stamp firmly 
on US nuclear weapons policy. The NPR describes an uncertain strategic environment characterized 
by a ‘return to great power competition’ in which the United States is perceived to have fallen behind 
its adversaries. Its underlying approach to deterrence in Europe, rooted in the logic of ‘peace through 
strength’, is designed to challenge head-on perceived Russian aggression and Moscow’s supposed 
willingness to engage in a ‘limited nuclear first-strike’. To do so, it argues, the United States needs to 
broaden its nuclear options and increase the diversity and flexibility of its forces. Primarily, it 
expands the role of nuclear deterrence to encompass ambiguously defined ‘non-nuclear strategic 
attacks’ as well as signalling US willingness to engage in limited nuclear retaliatory strikes. For this 
purpose, the NPR proposes developing and building new low-yield non-strategic nuclear weapons, 
including a new sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) and modified submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles (SLBMs) to offer further low-yield nuclear options in addition to the US B61 gravity bombs 
already forward-deployed in Europe. The NPR also signals that the Trump administration considers 
arms control with Russia unlikely in the near future, a point reinforced in October 2018 by the stated 
US intention to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, thus deepening 
the risks of a renewed nuclear arms race.1 
Much of the literature on Trump’s nuclear policy seeks to shed light on the degree of continuity or 
change with previous US administrations. For example, a number of former senior US policy-makers 
emphasized the NPR’s continuity, arguing that it was ‘in the mainstream of US nuclear policy’ as 
well as ‘prudent’ and ‘modest’ in its response to Russia.2 Other commentators, meanwhile, criticized 
it as a bold departure from previous nuclear policy positions, asserting that it ‘hastens the rise of a 
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1 Nuclear Posture Review 2018 (Washington DC: US Department of Defense, Feb. 2018). 
2 John R. Harvey, Franklin C. Miller, Keith B. Payne and Bradley H. Roberts, ‘Continuity and 
change in US nuclear policy’, Real Clear Defense, 7 Feb. 2018. 
 
more dangerous world’ by openly embracing nuclear competition.3 Ana Péczeli notes that while 
parts of the NPR align with previous positions on modernization and posture, it appears to ‘put arms 
control measures on the back seat’.4 Heather Williams maintains, however, that changes in the NPR 
are ‘more subtle’, contending that the largest shift was the acceptance of a cross-domain definition of 
strategic stability.5 
Absent from the assessments to date, however, has been an attempt to place nuclear policy 
developments within a fuller understanding of the deeper strategic direction being taken by the 
United States under its current conservative Republican leadership. This article will therefore offer a 
perspective that situates the Trump administration’s nuclear policy within the legacy of the long-held 
Republican Party idea of ‘peace through strength’. In this broader context, it will focus on European 
reactions to Trump’s policy to demonstrate how the changes to US nuclear policy, though intended 
to bolster nuclear deterrence and assurance to allies, actually challenge widely held European 
attitudes on nuclear deterrence, disarmament and arms control. Since February 2018, a number of 
European political leaders have expressed concerns over the direction of US nuclear policy, ranging 
from disquiet over the US decision to develop new low-yield nuclear weapons through opposition to 
the US abandonment of the Iran nuclear deal and the announced withdrawal from the INF Treaty to 
wider frustrations over the state of transatlantic relations and deteriorating relations with Russia.6 Of 
																																																						
3 See e.g. Adam Mount, ‘Trump’s troubling nuclear plan’, Foreign Affairs, 2 Feb. 2018, 
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‘Trump seeks expanded nuclear capabilities’, Arms Control Association, March 2018, 
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course, European views on nuclear weapons are not uniform. As this article shows, reactions have 
differed somewhat from state to state, and there has not been a completely unified view among 
European NATO members. Nonetheless, it is argued that the Trump administration’s nuclear policy 
broadly challenges the more traditionally ‘European’ approaches to the issues of nuclear declaratory 
policy, faith in the deterrent value of existing nuclear weapons platforms, and the future of arms 
control. 
We argue that to understand the NPR it should be considered in the context of the Trump 
administration’s stated ‘peace through strength’ approach to foreign and security policy. This is a 
strand of conservative Republican foreign policy thinking that historically has been controversial 
with Europeans, has created a number of past challenges to the maintenance of NATO cohesion and 
has increased nuclear tensions with Russia. We begin by situating the Trump administration’s 
nuclear policy within the context of the ‘peace through strength’ approach, analysing its underlying 
logic and considering why the approach concerns several European NATO members. We then 
consider the extent to which US nuclear policy now challenges common European understandings in 
three principal areas: nuclear declaratory policy, intra-alliance cooperation on modernization, and 
arms control. First, we contend that changes to US nuclear doctrine and declaratory policy that 
expand nuclear deterrence challenge European assumptions on the role of nuclear weapons in 
defending NATO. Second, we argue that the US decision on low-yield nuclear warheads and its 
implications for intra-alliance cooperation signal a lack of faith in the current forward-deployed 
nuclear weapons in Europe and could widen and accentuate controversial debates about the US 
commitment to Europe. Third, we argue that the apparent US rejection of arms control will widen 
the scope of discord with European leaders. We conclude by noting that Europeans leaders need to 
assert a clear and credible vision to the Trump administration if they hope to forestall a renewed 












‘Peace through strength’ and the return to Great Power competition 
Given Trump’s disparaging remarks about the alliance during his election campaign, early fears that 
his administration would spurn its NATO allies and become an unreliable partner in transatlantic 
security appeared well founded. President Trump was expected to be unpredictable and disruptive. 
Once in office, he appeared uninterested in tempering his views .7 He sent threatening letters to 
European leaders demanding they meet defence spending commitments, made critical or offensive 
off-the-cuff remarks and tweets in open criticism of allied leaders, and often surprised or 
contradicted even his own foreign policy advisers on the importance of transatlantic relations. It is 
tempting to regard the Trump administration as lacking strategic direction.8 There is certainly no 
shortage of accounts of the chaotic nature of decision-making in the Trump White House, along with 
claims that some advisers have been running a quiet resistance to the President’s more impetuous 
actions.9 There is, however, an important distinction to be made between the extraordinary 
personality and performance of the President himself and the more ordinary processes of executive-
branch policy-making occurring within his administration. Like other strategic policy documents 
published by the Trump administration, the NPR and subsequent policy were created through an 
inter-agency process that involved the Pentagon and a number of senior officials, many of whom 
have served in previous Republican administrations. Similarly, the US decision to withdraw from the 
INF Treaty has been attributed to the influence of Trump’s third National Security Advisor, John 
Bolton, who has frequently advocated that US power be unconstrained by international treaties. 
Despite the fractious nature of internal relations and the shoot-from-the-hip style of the President 
himself, the administration has rooted its strategy in a discernible security policy maxim. 
The underlying logic of the Trump administration’s foreign and security policy, underpinning the 
NPR and the other security and defence strategy documents the administration has issued, is the idea 
of ‘peace through strength’. While Charles Krauthammer has characterized the Trump approach to 
foreign and security policy as ‘revolutionary’, the administration has publicly situated its policy 
within longstanding traditions of Republican presidencies.10 Not only did Trump assert in his 
																																																						
7 Joyce P. Kaufman, ‘The US perspective on NATO under Trump: lessons of the past and prospects 
for the future’, International Affairs 93: 2, March 2017, pp. 251–66. 
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Affairs 93: 5, Sept. 2017, pp. 1013–37. 
9 See e.g. Bob Woodward, Fear: Trump in the White House (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2018).  
10 Charles Krauthammer, ‘Trump’s foreign policy revolution’, Washington Post, 26 Jan. 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/trumps-foreign-policy-
 
inaugural address on 20 January 2017 that ‘America First’ would be the fundamental core of his 
foreign policy; the administration also issued a short précis of its foreign policy stance on the newly 
refreshed White House website, including the significant declaration that ‘peace through strength’ 
would be the central guiding principle of that policy.11 When the website was refreshed again in 
2018, the statement became even clearer in its intent: ‘Rebuilding US deterrence to preserve peace 
through strength must be our nation’s top priority.’12 This maxim of ‘peace through strength’ has 
been a mainstay of conservative Republican Party foreign policy thinking since at least Ronald 
Reagan’s presidency (1981–9), with deeper roots reaching back to the failed presidential campaign 
of Barry Goldwater in 1964.13 The idea of ‘peace through strength’ is that, although global peace and 
stability are the stated goals of US policy, they can only be achieved if the United States is in a 
position of perceived strength internationally. When adopted by an administration, this approach 
results in the United States striving to project the credibility of its power and resolve to allies and 
adversaries alike, partly through uncompromising and often nationalistic rhetoric, but also by 
signalling a buildup of military resources coupled with a demonstrable willingness to use them. In 
the 1980s, Reagan argued that his anti-Soviet rhetoric, deployment of nuclear cruise missiles to 
Europe, development of the Strategic Defense Initiative, willingness to threaten and use conventional 
force, and opposition to the nuclear freeze and disarmament movements were necessary steps 
towards achieving credible peace from a perceived position of strength. As he put it: ‘The reality is 
that we must find peace through strength.’14 While his approach did eventually lead to deeper 
nuclear arms reduction agreements with the Soviet Union, in particular the INF Treaty, it was a 
highly risky strategy that re-intensified the Cold War, deepened tensions in Europe and the Middle 




11 ‘America First foreign policy’, White House website, accessed 20 Jan. 2017.  
12 ‘National security and defense’, White House website, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/national-security-defense/  
13 Trevor McCrisken, ‘Past is present: the future of conservative US foreign policy’, in Joel 
Aberbach and Gillian Peele, eds, Crisis of conservatism?: The Republican Party, the conservative 
movement and American politics after Bush (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011) pp. 357–78. 
14 Ronald Reagan, ‘Remarks at the annual convention of the National Association of Evangelicals in 
Orlando, Florida, March 8, 1983’, in Public Papers of the Presidents, Ronald Reagan, 1983, 
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of nuclear war when NATO’s Able Archer exercises in autumn 1983 were misread as preparation for 
an actual first strike against the Soviet Union, which consequently came close to launching a pre-
emptive strike.15 The European experience of the consequences of the US ‘peace through strength’ 
approach in the 1980s, therefore, contribute to a wariness now of a President and an administration 
who are again drawing on the idea as they reformulate US nuclear strategy. 
The Trump administration’s clearest exposition of the ‘peace through strength’ concept came in its 
first National Security Strategy (NSS), issued on 18 December 2017, which featured the maxim 
‘preserve peace through strength’ as one of its four ‘pillars’. The document made plain that a 
fundamental element of this strategy would be ‘rebuilding our military so that it remains pre-
eminent, deters our adversaries, and if necessary, is able to fight and win’. Central to this enterprise 
are nuclear weapons, which, the administration declared, form ‘the foundation of our strategy to 
preserve peace and stability by deterring aggression against the United States, our allies, and our 
partners’. The NSS called for ‘significant investment’ and ‘modernization’ to ensure Washington can 
‘maintain the credible deterrence and assurance capabilities provided by our nuclear Triad and by US 
theater nuclear capabilities deployed abroad’. In short, the NSS stressed that nuclear weapons 
‘remain the most significant existential threat to the United States’ and suggested that the subsequent 
NPR would solidify the idea of ‘peace through strength’ in US nuclear forces.16  
The NSS named Russia alongside China as Washington’s main competitors for global influence, 
accusing both of challenging ‘American power, influence and interests’ and attempting to ‘erode 
American security and prosperity’. Russia and China were listed alongside international terrorist 
organizations and so-called ‘rogue states’—North Korea and Iran—as the greatest threats to US 
security.17 The administration’s position on Russia was further reinforced in the National Defense 
Strategy of January 2018. Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis released an unclassified summary of 
this document and remarked publicly that ‘great power competition, not terrorism, is now the 
																																																						
15 See Nate Jones and Thomas S. Blanton, Able Archer 83 (New York: New Press, 2016); Taylor 
Browning, 1983: the world at the brink (London: Little, Brown, 2018). 
16 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017 (Washington DC: The 
White House, 2017), pp. 4, 25, 30. 
17 NSS 2017, pp. 2–3; Chris Layne, ‘The US–Chinese power shift and the end of the Pax Americana’, 
International Affairs 94: 1, Jan. 2018, pp. 89–111; Bjorn Elias Mikalsen Gronnin, ‘Operational and 
industrial military integration: extending the frontiers of the Japan–US alliance’, International 
Affairs 94: 4, July 2018, pp. 755–72.  
 
primary focus of US national security’.18 In this context, there was little surprise that the NPR also 
declared a ‘return to great power competition’, expressing the US perception that its nuclear 
capabilities have diminished relative to those of its adversaries.19 The Trump administration 
appeared to be responding assertively to the deeply negative security dynamic between the United 
States and Russia, echoed within NATO, that had grown during the Obama administration.  
President Trump’s personal view of his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin, however, has often 
seemed in contradiction to the strategic assertion of US strength towards Moscow. During his 
election campaign Trump was highly complimentary about Putin, and although the continuing 
allegations of collusion with Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential election have made 
him more circumspect at times, his public admiration for the Russian President stands in stark 
contrast to his criticism towards some allies. The Helsinki summit in July 2018 was overshadowed 
by Trump’s controversial refusal during the joint press conference to confront Putin over Russian 
meddling in US elections. Although the two men expressed the belief that it was ‘necessary to work 
together further to interact on the disarmament agenda’, there was no tangible progress to relieve 
nuclear tensions.20 Trump’s announcement in October 2018 of the intention to withdraw from the 
INF Treaty took both America’s allies and Moscow by surprise and suggested that Bolton’s 
influence was in the ascendancy, reflected in Trump’s willingness to accept a more critical line 
towards Russia.21 Putin had responded forcefully to Russia’s negative characterization within US 
strategy documents, including the NPR, by announcing to the duma in March 2018 the development 
of three new strategic ‘doomsday’ nuclear weapons, showing video mock-ups suggesting the United 
States as their potential target. The Russian position indicates further the risk of a renewed nuclear 
																																																						
18 James N. Mattis, ‘Remarks by Secretary Mattis on the National Defense Strategy’, US Department 
of Defense, 19 Jan. 2018, https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-
View/Article/1420042/remarks-by-secretary-mattis-on-the-national-defense-strategy/. 
19 NPR 2018, pp. 5–7. 
20 The White House, ‘Remarks by President Trump and President Putin of the Russian Federation in 
joint press conference’, Presidential Palace, Helsinki, 16 July 2018, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-president-putin-russian-
federation-joint-press-conference/.  
21 Julian Borger and Martin Pengelly, ‘Trump says US will withdraw from nuclear arms treaty with 
Russia’, Guardian, 20 Oct. 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/20/trump-us-
nuclear-arms-treaty-russia. 
 
arms race, especially if the INF Treaty collapses and there is no extension to New START or a 
successor treaty.22 
The ‘peace through strength’ approach is also significant for Washington’s NATO allies because 
Trump’s assertion of US interests, strength and resolve has often been directed at them as well as 
adversaries. Trump’s reluctance to affirm the US commitment to NATO collective defence, 
criticisms of the perceived inadequacy of allied defence spending, abandonment of the Iran nuclear 
deal despite concerted European lobbying, and instigation of a transatlantic trade war, raised fears 
that the 2018 Brussels NATO summit would be disastrous. The resulting summit declaration, forged 
despite Trump’s attempts at disruption, did deepen the alliance’s refocus on deterrence, begun at 
Warsaw in 2016, and contained bold measures to bolster NATO’s capability to defend against the 
perceived Russian threat. NATO reaffirmed much of the Warsaw communiqué’s language on 
nuclear deterrence and arms control, while expressing concern over the INF Treaty and recognizing 
the contribution of New START to international stability. The relatively hostile rhetoric Trump used 
towards allies at the NATO summit, however, contrasted starkly with his controversial friendliness 
towards Putin in Helsinki the following week. 
The administration’s ‘peace through strength’ approach and the attendant changes in US nuclear 
policy send signals to European allies that continue to cast doubt on NATO’s mutually agreed 
policy. As Michaels and Williams note, ‘Trump’s approach to signalling is unique, and potentially 
destabilizing.’23 The remainder of this article, therefore, analyses whether these changes achieve, 
from the perspective of Europeans in NATO, the Trump administration’s stated goal of bolstering 
deterrence against Russia and grant the desired assurances to allies. A stronger alliance is not only 
synonymous with stronger nuclear deterrence, but requires intra-alliance nuclear cooperation and a 
convergence of priorities.24 In the following three sections we analyse broad European reactions to 
US changes to nuclear declaratory policy, Washington’s modernization plans and its approach to 
arms control, to suggest that the Trump administration is actually challenging alliance cohesion in its 
efforts to provide ‘peace through strength’. 
																																																						
22 The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), entitled in full ‘Measures for the Further 
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms’, was signed in 2010 and entered into force 
the following year. It is due to expire 5 February 2021 but has an option to extend it to 2026. 
23 Jeffrey Michaels and Heather Williams, ‘The nuclear education of Donald Trump’, Contemporary 
Security Policy 38: 1, 2017, pp. 54–77. 
24 Stephan Frühling and Andrew O’Neil, ‘Nuclear weapons and alliance institutions in the era of 
President Trump’, Contemporary Security Policy 38: 1, 2017, pp. 47–53. 
 
Expanding nuclear deterrence 
One principal cause of concern in Europe is the proposals in the NPR that signal US willingness to 
engage in limited nuclear strikes and expand the circumstances of nuclear use. Such changes reflect 
the ‘peace through strength’ approach, in which credible nuclear deterrence requires all options to be 
on the table. However, it may have the unintended consequence of increasing nuclear risk, through 
inadvertently lowering the threshold for nuclear use; challenging allied consensus on nuclear 
deterrence and the need to gradually restrict the circumstances for nuclear use; and signalling a lack 
of US confidence in existing US nuclear options, undermining rather than enhancing their credibility. 
The NPR’s changes, made principally to counter a supposed Russian willingness to engage in 
‘limited nuclear first use’, attempt to plug a perceived credibility ‘gap’ and ‘correct’ the ‘mistaken 
confidence that limited nuclear employment can provide a useful advantage’. Accordingly, the NPR 
outlines plans to develop new low-yield non-strategic nuclear weapons and signals US willingness to 
make limited retaliatory strikes.25 Its view of Russian nuclear doctrine, however, is strongly 
contested by Bruno Tertrais: ‘Russia is not building new dedicated theatre-nuclear systems, and there 
is little evidence of new “low-yield” warheads; it does not have an “escalate to de-escalate” doctrine; 
and it is not practising the use of nuclear weapons in large-scale military exercises.’26 Although 
NATO officials are sceptical about Russian intentions, Moscow’s official policy ‘reserves the right 
to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass 
destruction against it and (or) its allies’ and also permits their use if Russia is faced with the ‘use of 
conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is threatened’.27 While Putin has since 
stated that Russia would only use nuclear weapons in a ‘retaliation strike’, critics will maintain that it 
is more reasonable to gauge Russia’s nuclear threshold by its multiple low-yield nuclear capabilities 
than to trust its declaratory statements.28  
The US administration argues that rather than enabling nuclear war-fighting, its new doctrine and 
new non-strategic nuclear weapons will actually raise the nuclear threshold ‘by convincing the 
																																																						
25 NPR 2018, p. 53. 
26 Bruno Tertrais, ‘Russia’s nuclear policy: worrying for the wrong reasons’, Survival 60: 2, 2018, p. 
35. 
27 Security Council of the Russian Federation, Voennaya oktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii 2014 
(Moscow, 2014), http://scrf.gov.ru/security/military/document129/, para. 27.  
28 ‘Why would we want a world without Russia? Putin on Moscow’s nuclear doctrine’, Russia 
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adversary that even limited use of nuclear weapons will be more costly’.29 It is not unreasonable to 
conclude that Russia could be motivated by a similar logic. While intending to project strength by 
signalling a willingness to readily use nuclear weapons, nuclear postures reliant on limited nuclear 
strikes can send unintended signals. Indeed, if credible deterrence relies on the willingness to follow 
through on declaratory statements, as the NPR argues, then the new doctrine would entail the use of 
nuclear weapons earlier in a conflict if deterrence were to fail, thereby lowering the threshold for 
nuclear use. In the immediate aftermath of the review, public European responses were relatively 
muted, with the exception of the then German Foreign Minister’s comments ‘that the spiral of a new 
nuclear arms race has already been set in motion’ by the NPR’s apparent willingness to return to a 
doctrine based around tactical nuclear weapons.30 Some east European states which feel most 
threatened by Moscow, such as Poland and the Baltic states, however, quietly welcomed the NPR’s 
readiness to consider a limited nuclear strike to purportedly strengthen deterrence against Russia.31 
The NPR makes wider changes to US declaratory policy by expanding nuclear deterrence to include 
a range of circumstances that the Obama administration sought to restrict. Similarly to the 2010 
NPR, the 2018 document states that Washington would consider using nuclear weapons only ‘in 
extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States, its allies, and partners’.32 It 
expands this definition, though, to include ‘significant non-nuclear strategic attacks’ against a range 
of targets. This moves away from the Obama administration’s claims that it would use nuclear 
weapons only against nuclear threats and in ‘a narrow range of contingencies’ against conventional, 
chemical and biological threats from nuclear states. The new NPR expands this range to include 
attacks using emerging technologies, such as cyber, from both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon 
states.33  
																																																						
29 NPR 2018, pp. II, 54. 
30 German Federal Foreign Office, ‘Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel on the publication of the US 
Nuclear Posture Review’. 
31 Artur Kacprzyk, ‘Results of the US Nuclear Posture Review’, PISM Bulletin, no. 29, 2018, p. 2; 
Lukasz Kulesa, The 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review: a headache for Europe (London: European 
Leadership Network, Feb. 2018), https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-
2018-us-nuclear-posture-review-a-headache-for-europe/.  
32 NPR 2018, p. 21; Nuclear Posture Review 2010 (Washington DC: US Department of Defense, 
April 2010), p. 16. 
33 NPR 2018, pp. 16, 21. 
 
This shift has raised subsequent questions over the strength of US negative security assurances 
(NSAs) not to threaten non-nuclear weapon states with nuclear weapons. While the NPR reiterates 
that the United States will ‘not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-Nuclear Weapon 
States that are party to the NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] and in compliance with their 
nuclear non-proliferation obligations’, this statement is qualified first by a preceding statement about 
‘significant non-nuclear strategic attacks’ and second by the claim that Washington ‘reserves the 
right to make any adjustment in the [negative security] assurance that may be warranted by the 
evolution and proliferation of non-nuclear strategic attack technologies and US capabilities to 
counter that threat’.34  
The retention of a ‘right’ to apply nuclear deterrence to a range of future circumstances gives 
significantly increased value to nuclear weapons and challenges allies who wish to further tighten 
nuclear declaratory policy. At the 2018 NPT PrepCom discussion on disarmament and assurances, 
Germany stated: ‘It is timely to take a fresh look at [NSAs] and discuss whether they should be 
reaffirmed in order to boost the credibility and legitimacy of the nonproliferation regime.’35 
Similarly, the Netherlands asked what states could do ‘to reinforce the norm of non-use of nuclear 
weapons, core rationale of the NPT, for example by elaborating risk reduction measures, or by 
strengthening negative security assurances?’36 As states look to make progress ahead of the NPT 
Review Conference in 2020, the NPR’s declaratory policy position closes down avenues for further 
progress on declaratory policy. 
Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has sought to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in defence 
planning while maintaining that it will ‘remain a nuclear Alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist’. 
Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO re-emphasized deterrence and defence in 
																																																						
34 NPR 2018, p. 21.  
35 ‘Statement by Ambassador Michael Biontino, Permanent Representative of Germany to the 
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its declared position towards Moscow.37 Nevertheless, the Alliance has been reluctant to reopen 
controversial debates on nuclear weapons. The NPR’s changes to declaratory policy, however, call 
elements of NATO policy into question. First, the declared willingness to engage in limited nuclear 
strikes potentially contradicts the claim that NATO’s ‘nuclear force posture currently meets the 
criteria for an effective deterrence and defence posture’ and instead signals that this previous posture 
lacked credibility.38 As Matthew Harries notes, far from signalling strength and resolve, the NPR 
presents a ‘nervous’ United States, uncertain in its existing ability to deter Russia.39 Second, 
expanding the circumstances of nuclear use may undermine NATO statements that ‘nuclear weapons 
are unique’ and would ‘fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict’, by appearing to put nuclear 
weapons in the same category as other weapons under certain scenarios.40 While the 2018 Brussels 
declaration reiterates these phrases verbatim, the continuity in NATO’s language does not reflect the 
NPR’s proposals to expand deterrence to a range of new scenarios. One former US official, Frank 
Rose, who broadly welcomed the review, called the NPR’s language on non-nuclear strategic attacks 
a ‘self-inflicted wound that will fester for some time’.41 NATO policy documents, including the 2018 
declaration, note the importance of reducing both the number of nuclear weapons deployed in 
Europe and ‘reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy’. Conversely, Trump’s ‘peace through 
strength’ nuclear posture appears to actively increase reliance on nuclear weapons. 
The NPR also raises questions of freedom of choice in British and French declaratory policies. While 
both countries share a strong attachment to nuclear deterrence and deep concerns about Russia, they 
also retain a commitment to reduce the salience of their nuclear weapons and harbour doubts about 
the ‘peace through strength’ approach, which appears to give nuclear weapons increased prominence 
																																																						
37 NATO, Warsaw summit communiqué, July 2016, 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm, p. 54; Brussels summit declaration, 
2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm.  
38 NATO, Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, 20 May 2012, 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_87597.htm, p. 8. 
39 Matthew Harries, ‘A nervous Nuclear Posture Review’, Survival 60: 2, 2018, pp. 55–7. 
40 Such language has been repeated in NATO policy statements including the 2010 Strategic 
Concept, the 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review and the 2016 Warsaw communiqué.  
41 Frank A. Rose, Is the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review as bad as the critics claim it is? (Washington 
DC: Brookings Institution, April 2018). 
 
in security doctrines.42 Since the NPR, the difference between British or French and US thinking on 
limited nuclear war has been brought into the open: for example, there is no mention of limited 
strikes in either UK or French nuclear doctrine.43 The UK has felt forced to confirm that it remains 
‘confident we have a credible and capable nuclear deterrent’, but also that it accepts the new US 
capabilities for a limited nuclear strike are ‘intended to enhance deterrence’ in ‘the worsening 
security situation of the world’.44 If the United States pushes for assertive action and nuclear 
deployments early in a crisis to deter a limited nuclear strike, while European allies seek more 
restrained action, this could, as Lukasz Kulesa argues, allow Russia to exploit NATO confusion and 
capitalize on the political effects of this difference of opinion.45 While changes in US policy are 
designed to bolster deterrence by projecting strength, they could inadvertently signal a lack of 
confidence on the part of the Trump administration in the established view that NATO can deter 
nuclear threats through strategic nuclear means, while deterring wider conventional, biological, 
chemical and emerging threats through conventional means. This positioning sits uneasily with 
general European opinion within NATO, which values US strategic nuclear forces as ‘the supreme 
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Re-opening debates  
The NPR expands on the United States’ nuclear modernization plan initiated under President Obama. 
Significantly for Europe, the NPR continues the Life Extension Program to modernize B61 gravity 
bombs and, by 2024, replace the dual-capable aircraft (DCA) deployed in Europe, as well as 
introducing new plans to develop and deploy modified low-yield SLBMs and nuclear-tipped 
SLCMs. The Trump administration emphasized these non-strategic nuclear weapons for the 
European theatre, closely linked to the NPR’s call for ‘tailored’ and ‘flexible’ deterrence, and the 
2018 NATO declaration gave stronger emphasis to NATO’s reliance on forward-deployed nuclear 
weapons.47 The articulation of these plans within a ‘peace through strength’ approach, however, 
presents a number of potential problems for intra-alliance politics on modernization. The divisive 
nature of Trump’s presidency exacerbates tensions and could re-open difficult discussions among 
those host states where scepticism persists over the utility of forward-deployed nuclear weapons. US 
dependence on low-yield nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War has been troubling for 
many European states. Especially for those that readily embraced President Obama’s Prague Agenda 
and those where domestic anti-nuclear sentiments are strong, such as Belgium, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Norway, increasing dependence under Trump’s administration exacerbates internal 
alliance divisions.48 
Questions remain over whether host states will maintain the DCA required for forward-deployed 
nuclear weapons. Many European host parliaments, for example in Belgium, Germany and the 
Netherlands, remain apprehensive about the long-term economic, political, diplomatic and security 
implications. For example, during the last NATO Strategic Concept Review, five NATO states, 
including three hosts, advocated removal of the B61s.49 The NPR lays a strong emphasis on burden-
sharing, so lacklustre European support could have a negative effect on relations with the United 
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States, especially ranged alongside internal disputes over defence spending and renewed US 
demands that NATO members meet their financial commitments. Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands 
and Turkey currently use the F-16, while Germany uses the Tornado for the nuclear role. Italy and 
the Netherlands have decided to replace their DCA with the F-35, while in other countries decisions 
are still pending. 
It has been suggested that European populism and public opposition to nuclear weapons could 
endanger replacement, despite continuing government-level support for the nuclear mission.50 For 
example, the Belgian parliament passed a resolution in 2015 asking the government to ‘take resolute 
steps towards nuclear disarmament . . . to make the Belgian territory completely free of nuclear 
weapons’.51 Similarly, in 2013 the Netherlands parliament passed a resolution preventing the 
purchase of nuclear-capable versions of the new fighter jet, although the government ignored it. The 
centrist Democrat 66 party in the current Dutch coalition has stated its opposition to a nuclear role 
for the new F-35.52 Germany has been reluctant politically to host the B61s and Berlin has been 
seeking clarification over whether the Eurofighter, rather than American F-35, could be certified for 
the nuclear role.53 This political opposition reflects broader public wariness. In a recent poll of host 
state publics it was clear that significant percentages support removal of nuclear arms: 56 per cent in 
the Netherlands, 57 per cent in Belgium, 65 per cent in Italy and 70 per cent in Germany.54 The 
opposition to the DCA mission in host states contrasts with the eagerness to bolster deterrence on the 
part of some eastern allies, such as Poland, where defence officials have advocated making their F-
16s nuclear-capable.55 It is true that host-state governments have broadly maintained the nuclear 
missions against the grain of sceptical publics and parliaments. The rise of populist parties, however, 
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suggests that the ‘establishment’ consensus is vulnerable to political change, and the prevailing—and 
fragile—agreement on forward-deployed nuclear weapons could shift as a result. 
The US suggestion that forward-deployed nuclear weapons could be used in a limited ‘non-strategic’ 
nuclear strike may also deepen opposition. Until now, forward-deployed gravity bombs have been 
regarded as largely ‘political weapons’ on several months’ notice of use. Nevertheless, Russia has 
used the modernization of the B61 and DCA to criticize NATO, arguing that the F-35’s stealth 
capability may deliver a new option to penetrate deep into Russian airspace, thus transforming them 
from ‘political’ to ‘battlefield weapons’.56 Hans Kristensen has noted that host states could interpret 
the B61-12’s accuracy and penetration improvements as representing an effort to increase the 
usability of nuclear weapons and therefore an increase in NATO’s reliance on nuclear weapons 
within US doctrine.57 The NPR calls on NATO to ‘enhance the realism of training and exercise 
programs to ensure the Alliance can effectively integrate nuclear and non-nuclear operations, if 
deterrence fails’.58 Host states where anti-nuclear sentiment is strong risk aggravating opposition by 
engaging in such training if it is represented as practising nuclear war-fighting, even though the NPR 
goes to some lengths to assure that is not the intention. Similarly, states that do not wish to see any 
increase in tensions with Russia may resist such training, especially with dual-capable systems. In 
the past, training exercises involving nuclear weapons or dual-capable systems have been seen as 
provocative, have raised tensions and have led to dangerous misinterpretations, as noted earlier with 
regard to Able Archer in the 1980s. Given the current level of tensions with Moscow, an emphasis 
on the DCA mission, while conceived of by the United States as a projection of strength, could 
inadvertently highlight European opposition to the Trump approach and lead to dangerous 
miscalculations about intent. 
The NPR’s plans to develop a low-yield SLBM and a new SLCM also affect wider European debates 
on nuclear deterrence. These plans are designed to plug a supposed ‘credibility’ gap and project 
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strength; but they unintentionally signal that the United States doubts the ability of the existing B61 
and the proposed air-launched LRSO (Long Range Stand Off) cruise missile to provide a non-
strategic nuclear deterrent, and also contrast with broader NATO sentiments. Doubts over deterrence 
requirements could prompt a host state to reconsider its participation in nuclear sharing, especially if 
public sentiment supporting the Nuclear Ban Treaty or opposition to Trump’s presidency continues 
to build. A recent ICAN/YouGov poll shows strong host-state public support for the Ban Treaty (66 
per cent in the Netherlands and Belgium, 71 per cent in Germany and 72 per cent in Italy).59 
Conversely, greater European attachment to existing forward-deployed nuclear weapons may 
continue to develop as a way of ensuring the US commitment to Europe. The 2018 declaration, for 
example, strengthened NATO’s language on forward-deployed weapons. It stated clearly that its 
nuclear deterrence posture ‘relies on United States nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe and 
on capabilities and infrastructure provided by Allies concerned’, whereas previous statements such 
as the Warsaw communiqué stated only that the deterrence posture relied ‘in part’ on forward-
deployed weapons.60 It is unclear whether this change in language originated with the US or host 
states. Nevertheless, host states must continue to reconcile publics inclined to favour disarmament 
leaning publics with their nuclear deterrence commitments. 
It is possible, though relatively unlikely, that the ‘America First’ rhetoric and Trump’s treatment of 
allies could prompt Europeans to seek their own nuclear deterrent. The recent ‘Euro-nuke’ debate is 
a telling indication of European anxieties over the US commitment to NATO. After the 2018 
summit, a Welt am Sonntag article questioned whether the US nuclear guarantee was credible and 
prompted discussion within German newspapers and security publications about the idea of a 
German or pan-European nuclear weapon. Few German politicians support the idea, and it would 
require Germany, one of the European states most inclined to favour nuclear disarmament, to leave 
the NPT. The proposition nevertheless highlights the delicate and somewhat contradictory 
intersections between European reluctance to rely on nuclear weapons, opposition to Trump’s 
‘America First’ rhetoric, a lack of confidence in the ‘peace through strength’ approach, and anxiety 
over the credibility of the US security guarantee.61  
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The NPR could revive dormant but unresolved debates on the utility of low-yield nuclear weapons in 
Europe. While long-term effects are uncertain, reservations about nuclear sharing persist in host-state 
populations and parliaments, and now intersect with wider European concerns about Trump’s 
leadership. If a host state decided to quit sharing arrangements, this would have profound symbolic 
effect on the unity of NATO on nuclear issues. Rather than providing peace and stability, the US 
attempt to project strength through non-strategic nuclear weapons could cast doubt on the credibility 
of forward-deployed nuclear weapons and deepen tension with allies. 
Lacking leadership in arms control 
In line with many of President Trump’s statements, the NPR reflects little interest in engaging in a 
serious arms control agenda in Europe. As Williams notes, ‘this is unsurprising: arms control is 
typically associated with limiting capabilities, while this NPR is about hedging’.62 However, it did 
not reject arms control outright, instead placing faith in the idea that through projecting strength the 
United States can bring Russia to the negotiating table, much as Trump would argue has been 
achieved with North Korea. While this is understandable, given the wider US articulation of a ‘peace 
through strength’ foreign policy, the perceived scepticism towards multilateralism and arms control 
implies a fundamental criticism of the basis of nuclear ordering and an apparent rejection of global 
non-proliferation and disarmament efforts that are troubling for European allies.63  
When the Trump administration’s NPR was released, commentators expressed concern that it 
appeared to reject international arms control and failed to address the issue of disarmament. 
Although the review notes that arms control can be helpful in ‘decreasing misperception and 
miscalculation; and avoiding destabilizing nuclear arms competition’, there is not a single mention of 
Article VI of the NPT, which had been explicitly referred to throughout the 2010 NPR.64 As Oliver 
Meier notes, the NPR raises nuclear disarmament only once and then to dismiss it, saying it would 
‘require a fundamental transformation of the world political order’, and that this has not ‘taken place, 
nor is it emerging’.65 Even if Washington did not wish to project a lack of commitment to 
multilateral efforts, its use of language compared with the 2010 NPR has the effect of signalling that 
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Trump’s administration has limited interest in arms control and wider disarmament compared with 
Obama’s. A continued US commitment to disarmament structures and agreements is implied; while 
the 2018 document refers to a new ‘conditions’-based approach if the US is to make further 
reductions in its nuclear arsenal, it outlines no roadmap for creating the conditions to make further 
cuts, instead asking European allies to consider what steps could be taken at the 2018 NPT PrepCom. 
It concludes that ‘further progress [on arms control] is difficult to envisage’, given accusations of 
Russian non-compliance with existing arrangements, and that ‘Moscow must understand that the 
United States will not forever endure Russia’s continuing non-compliance’. Indeed, it asserts that 
unless circumstances change, ‘concluding further agreements with [Russia] would indicate a lack of 
consequences for its non-compliance and thereby undermine arms control’.66  
Arms control has deteriorated further since the NPR with Trump’s announced intention to 
‘terminate’ the INF Treaty. The demise of this treaty could result in ‘a new age of nuclear tension in 
Europe by setting off a domino effect in disrupting strategic arms control for the foreseeable future, 
impacting the likelihood of negotiating a New START successor treaty or any other new arms 
control agreements’.67 The result would be no mutually agreed caps on the world’s largest nuclear 
arsenals for the first time since 1972. Russia may hold out for progress on strategic arms control, or 
new asymmetric arms control involving ballistic missile defence. As Williams notes, while the NPR 
expands the definition of strategic stability beyond the nuclear level to include deterring ‘non-nuclear 
strategic threats’, problematically it does not expand the US definition of arms control beyond 
strategic offensive nuclear weapons.68 Herein lie the great risks involved in the US pursuit of a 
nuclear posture rooted in the notion of ‘peace through strength’—that the steps taken to demonstrate 
that strength, to allies and adversaries alike, end up pushing tensions and mistrust so far that moving 
to the ‘peace’ side of the equation becomes increasingly unlikely.  
The US approach to the INF Treaty and wider arms control has certainly become a point of discord 
within NATO. Before the US announcement, Europeans were unanimous in their calls to resolve the 
issues surrounding the INF Treaty and ensure a future for strategic arms control. Yet they had 
refrained from placing blame on Moscow to the same extent that the United States did. At the NPT 
2018 PrepCom, the EU encouraged ‘an active dialogue’ between the US and Russia over Moscow’s 
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INF compliance ‘to ensure the full and verifiable implementation of their commitments under this 
Treaty which is crucial for Europe’s security’.69 The 2018 NATO declaration toughened the stance 
of the majority of European states, noting: ‘Allies believe that, in the absence of any credible answer 
from Russia on [their] new missile, the most plausible assessment would be that Russia is in 
violation of the Treaty’; but it stopped short of condemning Russia for the violations. In the light of 
this approach, President Trump’s INF announcement left Europeans caught off guard as he walked 
away from a growing NATO consensus on the issue without consultation.70  
Europeans have broadly opposed Trump’s decision, while urging the United States to resolve 
compliance concerns within the confines of the treaty. As the German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas 
stated, ‘we have to make sure the baby is not thrown out with the bath water’; and the French 
President Emmanuel Macron called on ‘all the parties to avoid any hasty unilateral decisions, which 
would be regrettable’. The UK’s initial response differed from the majority: Defence Secretary 
Gavin Williamson came out in support of the US decision, saying that Russian non-compliance was 
‘making a mockery’ of the treaty. Since then, the Dutch government has stated that it has 
independently confirmed Russian non-compliance, and in November 2018 Germany successfully 
persuaded Washington to give Russia 60 days to come into compliance before initiating the process 
of withdrawal. Although they broadly acknowledge Russian non-compliance, European leaders 
remain wary of abandoning the treaty and pursuing a strategy of accusation and confrontation that 
could shut down dialogue and cooperation. There is a concern that the Trump administration strategy 
will result in the United States being blamed for the demise of the treaty, with subsequent knock-on 
effects for the arms control and non-proliferation regime.  
For European states wary of nuclear modernization and cognisant of the need to reduce nuclear 
arsenals, there are further concerns about arms control strategies that rely on increasing nuclear 
threats and risks. For example, the NPR’s sole stated arms control strategy relies upon the 
introduction of the SLCM to ‘provide the necessary incentive for Russia to negotiate seriously a 
reduction of its non-strategic nuclear weapons, just as the prior Western deployment of intermediate-
range nuclear forces in Europe led to the 1987 INF Treaty’. This strategy clearly puts faith in 
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Reagan’s ‘peace through strength’ strategy of the 1980s, but also entails a number of similar risks. 
The multiple justifications given for the SLCM potentially confuse any signalling that the United 
States is willing to negotiate it away. Similarly, the United States may struggle to coax Russia into 
compliance across launch platforms from sea to ground. Washington rightly realized that developing 
a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) would have explicitly violated the INF Treaty; but, more 
importantly, Europeans have no appetite for a twenty-first-century rerun of the 1980s Pershing 
missile crisis that caused substantial public and political opposition in host countries. A US show of 
strength in this respect might also be interpreted by Moscow not as an invitation to negotiate but as 
an attempt to gain strategic and military advantage. As both the United States and Russia believe 
their nuclear weapons developments are equalizing an unequal strategic balance, further weapons 
developments could heighten rather than reduce nuclear tensions and deepen the potential for a 
renewed arms race. The Russian Foreign Ministry has publicly interpreted the US development of a 
new SLCM and SLBM as introducing additional ‘battlefield weapons’ that represent a ‘dramatic 
lowering of the threshold conditions [that] can provoke a nuclear missile war even in a low-intensity 
conflict’.71 Notwithstanding Russian nuclear modernization, the current crisis has ignited concerns 
among European policy-makers that Russia will decide to lower its own nuclear threshold or develop 
counter-capabilities in response to the United States. The time-lag in nuclear modernization 
responses is notable. Russia portrayed its newly unveiled nuclear weapons in 2018 as a response to 
the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, which took place some 16 years 
earlier. The NPR’s arms control strategy, relying as it does on weapons development today, could 
have further unpredictable consequences for strategic stability many years down the line. 
While not related to arms control strictly speaking, Trump’s decision to decertify the Iran nuclear 
deal and re-impose sanctions on Tehran reveals the seriousness of potential disagreements within 
NATO over arms control and non-proliferation. European allies remain wedded to the deal, opening 
up a significant transatlantic rift. The unanimity and strength of European opinion on the Iran deal 
and the INF Treaty reflects a rejection of the US approach, and of the idea that the projection of 
strength and the use of threat can force a better deal.  
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European governments that welcomed Obama’s Prague Agenda of step-by-step disarmament and 
supported his stance on arms control and non-proliferation have been troubled by the US approach to 
arms control following the NPR, notwithstanding the realization shared by all NATO members that 
in recent years ‘the conditions for achieving disarmament have not become more favourable’.72 The 
NPR’s emphasis on extended nuclear deterrence as a ‘cornerstone of US non-proliferation efforts’ 
that enables allies to ‘forgo independent nuclear weapons capabilities’ seems out of step with the 
understanding in many European states of the difficulties facing the non-proliferation regime.73 
Similarly, public pressure to sustain the Ban Treaty throws lack of progress on the step-by-step 
agenda into even sharper relief. The Trump administration’s more adversarial approach to nuclear 
diplomacy can certainly be construed as a turn away from non-proliferation and disarmament, in 
contrast to the previous US administration. More widely, the NPR signals a strategic willingness to 
rely on deterrence more than non-proliferation or arms control. It appears to reflect a US willingness 
to accept a world in which nuclear deterrence has an expanded role alongside an unwillingness to 
lead on arms control and in wider steps to mitigate nuclear risks. Yet a willingness to ultimately 
pursue arms control should be inherent in a foreign policy approach that views the need to establish 
strength through power projection as a precondition for the creation of peace. 
Conclusion 
This article has shown that changes to US nuclear policy following the NPR have complicated 
NATO dynamics and damaged NATO cohesion on nuclear issues. There is a real risk that the US 
‘peace through strength’ approach will continue to deepen transatlantic divisions and the existing 
arms control crisis. While US nuclear policy clearly represents an attempt within the Trump 
administration’s ‘peace through strength’ foreign policy to bolster deterrence against Russia and 
provide increased assurance to allies, it may have unintended consequences. In Europe, changes in 
US policy are being interpreted as signalling a lowering threshold for nuclear use and a willingness 
to engage in a destabilizing arms race, and projecting a disregard for consensual decision-making. 
Such conclusions are felt even more keenly in view of the President’s adversarial and often erratic 
behaviour in his interactions with European leaders, and the administration’s increased willingness to 
openly criticize its allies. Although NATO continues to be resilient and has long experience in 
bridging US and varying European perspectives, for the reasons explored in this article Washington 
is finding it difficult to persuade Europeans to give vigorous support to a ‘peace through strength’ 
approach to nuclear issues. Europeans remain uneasy about proposals to expand nuclear deterrence 
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to cover non-nuclear threats and to use limited nuclear strikes to control escalation. Trump 
administration plans that increase the salience of non-strategic nuclear weapons in NATO planning 
revive unresolved discussions about European contributions to NATO’s nuclear deterrence 
capabilities that could in turn undermine the credibility of its deterrent value in the long term. 
Finally, the Trump administration’s strategy on arms control, which relies on increasing the nuclear 
threat, has deepened tensions with European allies. While nuclear cooperation has historically been a 
way of managing alliance relations and creating NATO cohesion, the Trump administration’s ‘peace 
through strength’ approach has damaged trust within the alliance. If such an approach fails to 
command broad European support, promotes neither NATO cohesion nor trust in the alliance, and 
does not reinforce security assurances, while creating risks in arms control and non-proliferation, its 
success must be considered questionable, to say the least. 
While European states’ responses have been relatively muted over the first two years of the Trump 
administration, as their transatlantic ally and security guarantor has diverged from the post-Cold War 
nuclear consensus and implemented a strategy designed to advocate US strength, dissenting opinions 
are increasingly being expressed—especially regarding arms control. At the same time, European 
governments are concerned about contesting US policy across a range of areas, given a President 
who is highly critical of his allies and their sympathy with the objective of facing up to Russia—even 
if they disagree with details of the methods espoused by Washington and are perhaps confused by 
the mixed messages that come from the Trump administration and in particular from President 
Trump himself. Yet the issues outlined in this article, if not tackled, will only grow, and will have 
impacts on NATO’s capability to deal with future challenges. NATO has historically provided an 
institutional framework for allies to raise nuclear concerns and seek consensus-based decisions with 
Washington, as well as to influence US policy. Europeans can use these mechanisms to address their 
concerns, strengthen the alliance and project a vision of a Europe based upon cooperative security 
and an appreciation of the positive value of restraint and arms control.  
If the West and Russia have already entered a new Cold War, one characterized by a heightened risk 
of miscalculation and misperception rather than an ideologically driven conflict, there are significant 
dangers for Europeans in policies that lower the nuclear threshold, expand the circumstances of 
nuclear use and endanger arms control. These bring into being nuclear insecurities not seen for over 
30 years. When the Reagan administration adopted a ‘peace through strength’ strategy in the early 
1980s, this too resulted initially in increased tensions in Europe, not only with nervous allies but 
also, provocatively, with its Soviet adversary, and greatly increased fear of nuclear war among 
publics. The Reagan administration, however, did move from the projection of strength to 
negotiating peace, and Reagan agreed with Mikhail Gorbachev that ‘nuclear war cannot be won and 
 
must never be fought’. The two leaders built a relationship of trust as they engaged in an ambitious 
arms control agenda to reduce tensions and move towards a more peaceful and cooperative 
relationship. Trump and Putin claimed this same objective in Helsinki but did little to convince 
observers they were serious, and developments around the INF have raised grave doubts about this 
mutual objective. Yet nuclear restraint, risk reduction and arms control could rebuild trust and 
confidence between the United States, NATO and Russia. This approach would provide a better 
route for the US to alleviate Great Power conflict and reassure European allies—the pressing issues 
that US nuclear policy seeks to solve. It is an approach that would also demonstrate real strength in 
US purpose and intent, and ultimately lead to more genuine opportunities for peace. In this context it 
is the responsibility of European allies to express their own vision and build a new European nuclear 
consensus, based on decreasing nuclear risks despite international political tensions. Early action by 
European governments to clarify an approach not based solely on the projection of perceived 
‘strength’ could clearly benefit longer-term cohesion in NATO and provide for more credible and 
sustainable European security. 
